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Abstract
Knowledge spillovers and labor mobility in industrial clusters are
interrelated phenomena. A ﬁrm’s knowledge is embodied in the entre-
preneur and in the specialized workers. Knowledge can spill over from
one ﬁrm to another through two channels: direct revelation from one
entrepreneur to another and labor mobility. We show that, in equi-
librium, an entrepreneur can disclose information to another in order
to avoid labor poaching. The incentive of ﬁrms to disclose informa-
tion voluntarily is one of the novel contributions of our paper. In the
absence of information disclosure, spillovers can still occur through la-
bor poaching. Labor poaching and voluntary disclosure of information
can also occur simultaneously in equilibrium. We also provide a ra-
tionale for the localized character of the spillovers and for the limited
geographical extensions of industrial clusters.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
The last few years have seen a growing interest in industrial clusters. Much
work has been devoted to the origins, the dynamics and the success of clus-
ters in modern industrial economies (for surveys, see, e.g., Rosenthal and
Strange, 2004, and Duranton and Puga, 2004). The analysis of clusters is of
course not new: it dates back at least to Marshall (1890). Marshall related
the competitive advantage of industrial clusters to three factors: the easy
transmission and discussion of new ideas, the availability of skilled workers,
and the availability of intermediate good suppliers.
Empirical analyses (see, e.g., Jaﬀe et al. 1993, Audretsch and Feldman,
1996, Baptista and Swan, 1996) have conﬁrmed that knowledge spillovers
are geographically localized and that there is a positive correlation between
clustering and innovation activity. At the same time, according to anecdotal
evidence and case studies, in some cases, technological spillovers take place
through voluntary knowledge dissemination and are not the result of simple
information leakage. Firms, even in the high-tech industries, adopt an open
research environment, allowing other subjects to access their knowledge.1
These two ﬁndings seem clearly related. As scholars of technological
progress have argued (see, e.g., Dosi, 1988), technological knowledge is com-
plex, tacit and cumulative. Therefore, it is diﬃcult to believe that involuntary
leakage of information can be the main source of knowledge spillovers: hav-
ing some spare information on a project is by no means close to knowing it.
Technological knowledge is hard to transfer through formal means and often
requires face-to-face communication. Firms that are located in the same area
have big advantages in learning from one another. The ability of ﬁrms in the
same cluster to exploit the same technology for market reasons suggests that
they share information to a great extent, much more than what would result
from sporadic involuntary information leakage.
As we said, in Marshall’s view, another characteristic of industrial clusters
is the large availability of skilled workers. A large pool of skilled worker in a
small area makes easier for ﬁrms to ﬁnd the labor skills that meet their needs.
The presence of many similar ﬁrms in a small area can also lead to labor
poaching and to a high rate of labor mobility. For instance, Saxenian (1994)
reported that the labor turnover in the Silicon Valley was high. Clearly,
1For anecdotal evidence and references to case studies, see, e.g., Baumol (2002) and
Lewis and Yao (2003).
2skilled labor poaching is another source of knowledge spillovers, since workers
can disseminate their knowledge to the rivals. Evidence on labor mobility is,
however, mixed. Recent empirical work on Italian industrial districts (see,
e.g., De Blasio and Di Addario, 2002), for instance, shows that in many
districts the turnover rate is not higher than in the rest of the national
economy.
This empirical and anecdotal evidence suggests many questions. Which
market forces lead rival ﬁrms to voluntary dissemination of information?
Why don’t spillovers spread outside a certain area? What determines the
extension of this area? Which incentives can be causal of labor mobility?
In this paper we will argue that knowledge spillovers and labor mobility
are inter-related phenomena. Moreover, their inter-relation helps to explain
why industrial clusters are limited to small geographical areas. In our econ-
omy, technological knowledge within a ﬁrm is embodied in the entrepreneur
and in the specialized workers. Knowledge can spill over from one ﬁrm to
another through two channels: 1) direct transmission of knowledge from one
entrepreneur to another; and 2) knowledge ﬂow resulting from skilled work-
ers’ mobility. The two channels are not independent. If the entrepreneur’s
and the workers’ knowledge are substitutes, the entrepreneur can avoid the
loss of his specialized workers by directly revealing knowledge to the rival
ﬁrm. Knowledge transmission is a way to avoid labor poaching. This is per-
haps our most novel and surprising result: in equilibrium, ﬁrms can have an
incentive to disclose information voluntarily. We also show that when the
entrepreneur decides not to disclose information, knowledge ﬂows from one
ﬁrm to another can still occur, since a competitor may ﬁnd it optimal to
poach the specialized workers. In fact, labor mobility and voluntary disclo-
sure of information are not mutually exclusive. We will demonstrate that
there are cases in which worker mobility may arise and, at the same time,
the employer of the specialized worker discloses information.2
2Baumol (2002) provides with some unsystematic evidence of our theory. He also argues
that researchers and scientists are often unwilling to work for a ﬁrm that does not want
them to share their knowledge with other researchers and this obliges the top management
to accept the dissemination of many results of the ﬁrm. Similar considerations are also
contained in Kornberg (1995). There is also evidence that worker mobility is an important
channel of knowledge dissemination. For example, in a study conducted through a series
of interviews, Von Hippel (1988) found that very frequently ﬁrms agree to train at no
cost workers of competing enterprises and that a ﬁrm’s personnel were sent to rival ﬁrms
to help in the use of new processes or techniques. Other evidence of spillovers through
specialized workers is provided by Saxenian (1994) and Almeida and Kogut (1999).
3In many industrial districts, the labor market for specialized workers is
localized in a speciﬁc geographical area. Clearly workers are much more in-
clined to change job in the same area than to move to another local labor
market, in order to avoid moving costs.3 Hence, the risk for a ﬁrm that
its workers move outside that local area is low and the ﬁrm does not have
any incentive to disclose information to competitors outside that area. This
can explain why technological externalities are localized and the ﬁrms ag-
glomeration does not expand beyond a geographical limit. The extension of
the labor market determines the extension of the industrial district. While in
some theoretical studies (see, e.g., Fujita and Ogawa, 1982) the informational
externality is simply postulated to be decaying with distance, our analysis
provides a justiﬁcation for the spatial limits of spillovers.
Obviously we do not consider our theory as the only explanation of en-
dogenous spillovers in clusters. Many other factors can provide an incentive
to entrepreneurs to share information. Local proximity can create good re-
lations within the business community: a sense of reciprocity can lead a ﬁrm
to reveal knowledge with the understanding that later the favor will be recip-
rocated. Although revealing information can result in a short term loss, it
can be a proﬁt maximizing choice in the long run as ﬁrms within the district
obtain an advantage over external ﬁrms by sharing information. Firms can
also choose information sharing as the eﬀect of a technological cooperative
agreement, even when they continue to compete in the market. Our analysis,
however, shows that voluntary dissemination of knowledge does not neces-
sarily presuppose reciprocity, since it can be simply explained by rivalry in
the product and in the labor markets. The mechanism for the endogenous
spillover that we identify also oﬀers a rationale for the localized character of
the spillovers and for the limited geographical dimension of the district.
A paper close in spirit to ours is that by Lewis and Yao (2003). They also
are interested in explaining information dissemination and workers’ turnover
in clusters. They study the employment relation between a ﬁrm and a spe-
cialized worker. They show that contractual incompleteness makes it optimal
for the ﬁrm to accept (to a certain degree) an open R&D environment (in
which the employee can diﬀuse information outside the ﬁrm) and to accept
a certain level of turnover. Their analysis is complementary to ours in that
they focus on the contractual relation inside the ﬁrm and explain why ﬁrms
3The role of distance as a barrier to workers’ mobility and to knowledge diﬀusion is
also studied in Combes and Duranton (2001). They do not analyze voluntary spillovers.
4do not necessarily adopt contracts that reduce labor mobility and informa-
tion sharing.4 Other papers close to ours are those by Combes and Duranton
(2001), Fosfuri and Ronde (2004) and Vilalta i Buﬁ (2004). Theses papers
analyze the role of labor poaching in the transfer of knowledge in industrial
clusters. In particular, the ﬁrst two papers discuss the trade-oﬀ between la-
bor pooling and labor poaching. Combes and Duranton (2001) discuss this
trade-oﬀ focusing on the role of product diﬀerentiation and of the market
size. Fosfuri and Ronde (2004), instead, focus on cumulative innovations
and trade secret laws. The paper by Vilalta i Buﬁ (2004), ﬁnally, discusses
the eﬃciency of the worker mobility and of the resulting spillovers. None of
these paper, however, considers the incentives of the ﬁrms (entrepreneurs) to
voluntary information disclosure. The papers by Gersbach and Schmutzler
(2003, 2003a) contemplate technological spillovers resulting from worker mo-
bility too. They study the ﬁrms’ incentives to invest in R&D in the presence
of such spillovers. They do not discuss the localized character of spillovers
and, as the previous papers, do not consider the possibility of voluntary
information disclosure.
While our analysis helps to understand knowledge ﬂows in industrial dis-
tricts, it also contributes to the more general literature on technological
spillovers. Almost all studies in this literature treat spillovers as involun-
tary information leakages. An exception is Katsoulakos and Ulph (1998).
The mechanism identiﬁed by these authors is very diﬀerent from ours. In
Katsoulakos and Ulph (1998) ﬁrms voluntarily choose information sharing
either because of technical complementarities or as the result of a technolog-
ical cooperative agreement.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the
model. Section 3 illustrates the product and labor market competition. Sec-
tion 4 discusses knowledge spillovers. Section 5 summarizes the equilibrium
outcomes. Section 6 discusses the results.
4Another paper that focuses on the relation between knowledge diﬀusion by the em-
ployees and the internal organization of the ﬁrm is Rodriguez-Palenzuela (1999).
52 The Model
2.1 Demand and Cost Functions
Two ﬁrms, denoted by 1 and 2, sell a homogeneous product. They face the
following linear demand, in the quantity space where the price is positive:
p =1− q1 − q2,
where p denotes the price and qi (i =1 ,2) is the quantity produced by ﬁrm
i.
Firm i’s total cost is given by
C (qi,K i,w i)=c(Ki)qi + wi,
where Ki (0 ≤ Ki ≤ 1) is ﬁrm i’ level of knowledge on the production process
and wi will be deﬁned below. The higher Ki, the higher the productivity and
the lower the cost of production. In particular, we assume that the marginal
cost is linear in the level of knowledge, i.e., c(Ki)=( 1− Ki).T h e ﬁrm’s
total knowledge level (Ki) depends on the knowledge of the entrepreneur,
the knowledge of the employees and the knowledge spillover that the ﬁrm
receives from the rival. Workers in the labor market are of two types: the
skilled, or high-type, worker, with a speciﬁck n o w l e d g e( kh) on the produc-
tion process, and the standard, or low-type, worker, with no knowledge (i.e.,
0=kl <k h). While there are many unskilled workers, available at a ﬁxed
wage in a competitive labor market, there is a limited supply of skilled work-
ers. In particular, we assume that there is only one worker of such a type.
The variable wi (wi ≥ 0) denotes the payment to the skilled worker for his
knowledge. In other words, wi is the quasi-rent that the skilled worker obtains
for his knowledge contribution, independently of his work in the production
process.5
As we said, ﬁrm i’s knowledge level Ki is a function of the knowledge
of the entrepreneur, ki > 0,t h ek n o w l e d g eo fi t sw o r k e r s ,kWi (which can




ni,w h e r eni is the number of workers. The wage for the standard workers is
exogenously determined in a competitive market and normalized to 1. If a ﬁrm employs
only standard workers, it will have a total cost equal to c(Ki)qi. If the ﬁrm employs the
skilled worker, it will have a lower unit cost, but, in addition to the standard wage, it will
have to pay wi to the worker for his contribution in terms of knowledge.
6be either kh or 0), and the amount of knowledge received from the rival,
ρjkj (j =1 ,2, j 6= i). The latter amount is given by the technological
knowledge of the other entrepreneur (kj) times the proportion of knowledge
that he decides to reveal, ρj (0 ≤ ρj ≤ 1).6 In particular, we assume that
Ki =m i n ( ki +kWi +ρjkj,1). The knowledge of an agent can be substituted
by the knowledge of another. Moreover, we consider learning as a multi-
dimensional heuristic process. Agents learn by trial and error, pursuing
diﬀerent paths. The probability that they know the “same things” is assumed
to be zero and, therefore, the knowledge that they have can be added.7
Notice, however, that when the maximum level of knowledge is reached,
receiving more knowledge is useless. While decreasing returns to knowledge
are crucial for our results, we use this particular formulation for simplicity’s
sake only.
Note that there are two possible sources of asymmetry between the two
ﬁrms: one ﬁrm only can employ the skilled worker, and, furthermore, the
entrepreneurs may have diﬀerent levels of knowledge. Without loss of gen-
erality, we assume that k1 ≥ k2. Furthermore, for expositional reasons, we
assume that the skilled worker is initially employed by the entrepreneur with
the higher level of knowledge.
2.2 Labor and Product Market Competition
We model the competition between the two ﬁrms as a three stage game. In
the ﬁrst stage, the entrepreneurs have the option to reveal, even partially,
their knowledge to the rival.
In the second, they compete for the high type worker. Finally, they choose
the quantity to sell. Formally, in the ﬁrst stage, entrepreneur i chooses the
level of technological spillover ρi. The technological spillover is exclusively
endogenous, i.e., there is no involuntary information leakage. In the second
stage, ﬁrms compete in the labor market for the high-type worker. They
simultaneously oﬀer a wage to the high-type worker. We assume that the
reservation value for the high-type worker is equal to 1 (the standard wage),
so that if a ﬁrm oﬀers him 1+wi, his participation constraint is always
6We are assuming that partial disclosure is possible and, moreover, useful to the other
ﬁrm. For many technologies, this is indeed the case (see, e.g., Bhattacharya et al., 1990).
7For other papers that use this interpretation of knowledge, see, e.g., d’Aspremont and
Jacquemin (1988), and Spence (1984).
7satisﬁed.8 Moreover, we assume that the worker can move from ﬁrm 1 to
ﬁrm 2 at no cost and that only in the case of indiﬀerence (i.e., when the two
ﬁrms oﬀer him the same wage) he prefers to stay at ﬁrm 1.9 The two ﬁrms
compete for one worker only. Hence, the skilled worker will obtain a wage
equal to the lower increase of proﬁt that he can generate for either ﬁrm, as
it will become clear in the following section.
In the third stage, ﬁrms choose simultaneously and independently their
production quantities.
3 Production and Labor Market Decisions
In this section we start our equilibrium analysis. We solve the three-stage
game backwards to ﬁnd the subgame perfect equilibria.
3.1 The Production Stage
In the third stage, each ﬁrm chooses the level of production, qi to maximize
the proﬁt function
(1 − qi − qj)qi − (1 − Ki)qi − wi.
This function is strictly concave in qi. Given our assumptions, both ﬁrms
want to produce a strictly positive quantity as long as Ki ≤ 2Kj.I n t h i s

















If Ki > 2Kj, in contrast, ﬁrm i will be a monopolist, producing the quantity
qM (Ki)=1
2Ki, and earning the proﬁt ΠM (Ki)=1
4K2
i .
8See footnote 5 for a justiﬁcation.
9This last assumption is needed only to rule out some trivial multiple equilibria.
83.2 The Hiring Decisions
The two ﬁrms choose simultaneously and independently the wage oﬀer to the
skilled worker. In equilibrium, this wage must be equal to the lower extra-
proﬁt that the worker is able to generate for either ﬁrm. Given the Bertrand
competition in the labor market, the ﬁrm with the higher beneﬁtf r o mt h e
worker will employ him at that wage.
Let us determine which ﬁrm employs the worker. First, let us consider
the monopoly and let us assume that there are no knowledge spillovers, i.e.,
ρ1 = ρ2 =0 . In this case, there are two possibilities. Either potential entrant
(ﬁrm 2) too can become a monopolist by hiring the worker (i.e., k2+kh > 2k1)
or not.10 In the latter case, the worker is clearly more beneﬁcial to ﬁrm 1.
Indeed, by keeping the worker, this ﬁrm keeps its monopolistic position, while
ﬁrm 2, by entering the market, can only earn the proﬁt of a duopolist. In
the former case, ﬁrm 2 can become a monopolist too, but its proﬁtw o u l d
still be lower than (or at most equal to) ﬁrm 1’s, as it would have a lower (or
equal) level of knowledge and, therefore, a lower productivity. Hence, ﬁrm 1
will keep the worker and pay him a salary equal to the proﬁto ft h ep o t e n t i a l
entrant.
Lemma 1 If the industry is a monopoly, i.e., k1 + kh > 2k2,t h e nﬁrm 1
keeps the worker and remains a monopolist.
Proof. See Appendix
Now, let us move to the case in which the industry is a duopoly. By
employing the worker, ﬁrm i earns a gross proﬁt increase (with respect to
















,min(kj + ρiki + kh,1)
¢
.
When entrepreneur i employs the worker, he obtains two beneﬁts: he in-
creases his ﬁrm’s knowledge level and avoids the worker working for the
rival. Both eﬀects are taken into account in the previous expression.
10A third case is that where ﬁrm 2 cannot enter the market even by hiring the worker.
In this case, trivially, there is no scope for worker mobility.
9Firm 1 keeps the worker if and only if:
Π(min(k1 + ρ2k2 + kh,1),min(k2 + ρ1k1,1))−
Π(min(k1 + ρ2k2,1),min(k2 + ρ1k1 + kh,1)) ≥
Π(min(k2 + ρ1k1 + kh,1),min(k1 + ρ2k2,1))−
Π(min(k2 + ρ1k1,1),min(k1 + ρ2k2 + kh,1)).
In the next lemma we ﬁnd the conditions under which ﬁrm 1 (or ﬁrm 2)
employs the worker in the absence of knowledge spillovers, i.e., for ρ1 = ρ2 =
0.
Lemma 2 If the market is a duopoly, i.e., k1 + kh ≤ 2k2,t h e nﬁrm 1 keeps
the worker under these conditions:
1) k1 + kh ≤ 1,o r





4(1−k1)+5kh ,a n dkh ≤ 1
5,o r
3) k1 + kh > 1, k2 ≤ min
µ
8








5 <k h < 2
5
4) k2 + kh > 1, k2 ≤ 8
5 − k1,a n dkh ≥ 2
5.
Proof. See Appendix
Two forces determine which ﬁrm has a higher beneﬁt from the skilled
worker. The entrepreneur with a higher knowledge (lower unit cost) can
spread the reduction of the unit cost over a larger production. The eﬀect
of the worker on the unit cost, however, may be lower for this ﬁrm because
of the decreasing returns to knowledge. Remember that when a ﬁrm has
reached a level of knowledge of 1, additional knowledge provided by the
worker is useless. This explains the conditions in the lemma. When both
entrepreneurs have “little” knowledge (i.e., when k1+kh ≤ 1), they can both
completely beneﬁt from the worker’s knowledge, and, hence, ﬁrm 1 has a
higher beneﬁt from the worker. In fact, while both ﬁrms can completely
beneﬁt from the worker’s knowledge, ﬁrm 1 can spread the reduction of the
unit cost over a larger production. A necessary condition for ﬁrm 2 to have
ah i g h e rb e n e ﬁt from the worker is that entrepreneur 1 has a “high” level
of knowledge, i.e., k1 + kh > 1. Even under this condition, however, ﬁrm
1 has a higher beneﬁt, provided that ﬁrm 2 has a level of knowledge lower
than a threshold. In these circumstances (conditions 2 and 3 of the previous
Lemma), although ﬁrm 1 cannot use the worker’s knowledge completely, it
10has a higher beneﬁt than the other ﬁrm, since the latter can exploit the
increase in productivity for a low production only.
In summary, ﬁrm 2 is only able to hire the worker when entrepreneur
1 has so much knowledge that his return on the worker’s knowledge is low.
Moreover, entrepreneur 2’s knowledge must be higher than a certain thresh-
old. If not, ﬁrm 2’s gains of productivity by hiring the worker would only
be exploited for a small production level, while ﬁrm 1,b yl o s i n gt h ew o r k e r ,
would suﬀer a loss of productivity for a large production level.
We can gain further intuition on the Lemma noting that when there is
ab i gd i ﬀerence between the two entrepreneurs’ knowledge, the market is
c l o s et oam o n o p o l i s t i cs t r u c t u r e . I ft h ew o r k e rm o v e df r o mﬁrm 1 to ﬁrm
2, the market would evolve towards a more symmetric duopoly: the gain of
the small duopolist by hiring the worker could not compensate for the loss
suﬀered by the quasi monopolist.
We illustrate the previous Lemmas in Figures 1 and 2. In Figure 1 we
show the line k1+k2 = 8






4(1−k1)+5kh for three diﬀerent values of kh (1
5, 1
3, 2
5) (in dotted line in
the region where it is not binding). Moreover, we also present the inverse
function k1 = f−1 (k2,k h) above the 45 degree line (only in the region where
it is binding).
Firm 1 has a higher beneﬁt from the worker when k2 is below either AB
or f (k1,k h), depending on the value of kh.F o ra h i g hkh, i.e., kh ≥ 2
5,t h e
function f (k1,k h) does not cross the line AB and it is not binding. For
as m a l lkh, i.e., kh < 1
5, in contrast, the function crosses AB above the 45
degree line and AB becomes not binding. For intermediate values of kh,b o t h
functions are binding.
Finally, notice that when kh increases (up to 2
5), the area for which ﬁrm 2
has a higher beneﬁt from the worker increases as well. This is quite intuitive:
when kh is higher, the worker’s knowledge starts becoming irrelevant for the
big ﬁrm for smaller values of k1.
I nF i g u r e2w ep r e s e n tt h es a m ea n a l y s i sf o rkh = 1
3 only. The curve with
negative slope results from merging the relevant (i.e., binding) parts of AB,
f and f−1.I tr e p r e s e n t sv a l u e so fk1 and k2 for which ﬁrm 1 and ﬁrm 2 have
t h es a m eb e n e ﬁt from employing the worker. Of course the two ﬁrms have
t h es a m eb e n e ﬁt also when they are identical, i.e., along the 45◦ line. Firm
1 has a higher beneﬁt in the area denoted by I (and I0). In a specular way,























Figure 2: Areas in which ﬁrm 1 or ﬁrm 2 employ the worker (for kh = 1
3).
(and II0). Given our assumption that k1 ≥ k2, only the triangle below the
45◦ line is relevant for the present analysis. Nevertheless, we also consider
the area above it, given that — as we shall see — after the spillover, ﬁrm 2
may happen to have a bigger knowledge level than ﬁrm 1.
4 Technological Spillovers
I nt h ep r e v i o u ss e c t i o nw ei d e n t i ﬁed the levels of knowledge for which the
specialized worker will keep working for ﬁrm 1 or will be hired by ﬁrm 2.N o w ,
we discuss the possibility that either entrepreneur wants to give knowledge
to the other in the ﬁrst stage of the game. There are two reasons for which
a ne n t r e p r e n e u rm a yb ew i l l i n gt od os o .
13First, the entrepreneur who — in the status quo — employs the worker, may
give knowledge to the rival for the purpose of lowering the wage. Recall that
the wage paid by an entrepreneur is just equivalent to the extra-proﬁtt h a t
t h ew o r k e ri sa b l et og e n e r a t ef o rt h ec o m p e t i t o r .M o r e o v e r ,t h ek n o w l e d g e
of the worker and that of the entrepreneurs are substitute. Therefore, giving
knowledge to the rival may lower the surplus that the rival can obtain from
the worker and, thus, may reduce the wage. Clearly, giving knowledge to the
rival has a negative eﬀect too, since the rival becomes stronger. The voluntary
spillover is proﬁtable if the positive eﬀect on the labor cost overwhelms this
negative eﬀect.
A second reason for endogenous spillovers is that an entrepreneur may
try, through the spillover, to change the status quo, i.e., the conditions of the
second stage of the game and, therefore, to be able to employ the worker.
Consider the case in which—for the original levels of knowledge—ﬁrm 1 loses
the worker. If entrepreneur 1 reveals knowledge to ﬁrm 2, he may reduce
t h ew o r k e r ’ si m p o r t a n c ef o rt h er i v a l ,a n d ,t h e r e f o r e ,b ea b l et ok e e ph i m .
Similarly, consider the case in which, in the status quo, ﬁrm 1 is able to keep
the worker. Entrepreneur 2 may be willing to reveal knowledge to ﬁrm 1 in
order to make the worker less important for ﬁrm 1 and, therefore, be able to
poach him.
Before we start our analysis, it is just worth mentioning that neither
reason is relevant in the case of a monopolist. Clearly, the monopolist cannot
lower the worker’s wage by giving knowledge to the potential entrant. Indeed,
the worker’s wage is equal to the potential entrant’s proﬁt: this proﬁti sn o t
decreasing in the level of spillover. It is also obvious that the monopolist
does not need to poach the worker either, and, therefore, also the second
reason is irrelevant. Given these considerations, we can focus on the case of
a duopoly. We start by considering the possibility of spillovers in area I of
Figure 2.11
4.1 Technological Spillovers in Area I
In area I ﬁrm 1 is able to keep the worker. Therefore, in the absence of
spillovers, its net proﬁti s
11While Figure 2 is drawn for a speciﬁcv a l u eo fkh, a similar ﬁgure obtains for other
values.
14Π(min(k1 + kh,1),k 2)− (1)
[Π(min(k2 + kh,1),k 1) − Π(k2,min(k1 + kh,1))].
By revealing knowledge to the rival, ﬁrm 1 reduces its gross proﬁt( ﬁrst term
in the expression above), as the total knowledge of ﬁrm 2, K2,g o e su pf r o m
k2 to min(k2 + ρ1k1,1). At the same time, the increase in K2 may lower the
labor cost represented by the diﬀerence in bracket in the expression above.
Now we prove that, as long as ﬁrm 2 is “big enough,” ﬁrm 1 ﬁnds the
spillover proﬁtable.
Proposition 3 In Area I, ﬁrm 1 ﬁnds it proﬁtable to spill over knowledge









To understand this result, it is useful to refer to Figure 3. The Figure
illustrates the values (shaded region) for which the spillover is proﬁtable for
the cases in which kh ≥ 2
5.C o n s i d e rap o i n ti nA r e aI close to the 45 degree
line, where the two entrepreneurs have almost the same level of knowledge.
In this case, the worker is almost as useful to one ﬁrm as he is to the other.
T h u s ,h ec a na p p r o p r i a t em o s to ft h es u r p l u st h a th ei sa b l et og e n e r a t ef o r
either ﬁrm.12 Therefore, ﬁrm 1 may be willing to transfer knowledge to ﬁrm 2
in order to reduce the worker’s wage and to appropriate more of the surplus
that he generates. The worker’s wage is decreasing in the spillover if and
only if k2 + kh ≥ 1:t h i se x p l a i n so n eo ft h ec o n d i t i o n si nt h eP r o p o s i t i o n .
Now let us explain the other. When both entrepreneurs have a high level
of knowledge, as required by the ﬁrst condition, the net proﬁto fﬁrm 1 is
Π(1,k 2)−Π(1,k 1)+Π(k2,1). After maximum spillover (which turns out to
be the optimal level of spillover), this proﬁt is higher than in the status quo
for k2 > 3
5, which is indeed the other condition in the Proposition.
The level of optimal spillover is the maximum one. In order to reduce the
specialized worker’s wage, ﬁrm 1 prefers to reveal as much knowledge to ﬁrm
2 as possible up to reaching K2 =1 . In Figure 3, this means moving from
Area I to Area I0. Clearly, given that the maximum level of knowledge is
12In the extreme case in which the two ﬁrms are identical, the worker can appropriate
the entire surplus he generates and nothing would be left to the entrepreneur.
151, any spillover level ρ1 ≥ 1−k2
k1 is equally proﬁtable:13 through the spillover,
entrepreneur 1 wants to reach the maximum attainable level of asymmetry
with the competitor.
Now, let us discuss the possibility of a spillover from ﬁrm 2 to ﬁrm 1.I n
Area I, in the absence of spillovers, ﬁrm 2 will be unable to hire the special-
ized worker. By revealing knowledge, however, it may lower the importance
of the worker for the other ﬁrm and be able to poach him. After poaching
the worker from the rival, its proﬁt may be higher. In the next Proposition,
we ﬁnd the conditions under which this is true.
Proposition 4 Firm 2 ﬁnds it proﬁtable to spill over knowledge to ﬁrm 1
in Area I if and only if






2) k2 + kh < 1 and k2 ≥ 4
5 − 1
2kh.
Moreover, the optimal level of spillover is ρ2 ≥ 1−k1
k2 .
Proof. See Appendix
It is easy to see that condition 2 in the Proposition implies that k2 be
g r e a t e rt h a no re q u a lt o3
5. Therefore, the Proposition shows that, to ﬁnd
the spillover proﬁtable, entrepreneur 2 must have a level of knowledge higher
than a certain threshold.14 By looking at Figure 3, this is easily understood.
The purpose of entrepreneur 2 is “to move” from Area I to Area II.T h e
spillover from ﬁrm 2 increases ﬁrm 1’s knowledge. Only for high levels of
k2, however, this has the eﬀect of moving from Area I to Area II.W h e n
entrepreneur 2 has a low level of knowledge, the minimum level of K1 needed
to pass from one area to the other is never reached, even if he discloses all his
knowledge. When his level of knowledge respects the constraints indicated
above, not only is entrepreneur 2 able to hire the worker, he also ﬁnds it
proﬁtable. The optimal level of spillover turns out to be the maximum one.
When both entrepreneurs have a high level of knowledge, the specialized
worker extracts most of the surplus that he generates for his employer, i.e., he
earns a high wage, as we have already noticed above. The spillover increases
the diﬀerence in knowledge between the two entrepreneurs and reduces this
13Given that K2 =m i n {1,k 2 + ρ1k1}, clearly K2 =1for any ρ1 ≥ 1−k2
k1 .M o r e o v e r ,
given that k2 ≥ 3
5, 1−k2
k1 < 1.
14Note that both conditions also imply k1+k2 > 1.I nc o n d i t i o n1 we have k1 ≥ k2 ≥ 3
5
and hence k1 +k2 ≥ 6
5. Similarly, for condition 2. Moreover, note that in the Proposition
there is an implicit upper bound for kh, i.e., kh < 2
5.
16Figure 3: Region where there is spillover from ﬁrm 1 to ﬁrm 2 and from ﬁrm
2t oﬁrm 1 in area I.
wage. This labor cost reduction overwhelms the cost of competing with a
stronger rival and the entrepreneur prefers to reveal as much as he can.By
inspection of conditions 1 and 2 in the Proposition, it is easy to note that an
increase in the worker’s knowledge makes the spillover proﬁtable to ﬁrm 2
for a larger set of values of k1 and k2, as intuition would suggest. When the
specialized worker can give a higher contribution in terms of productivity,
ﬁrm 2 is more easily willing to disclose information in order to hire him.
Finally, notice that the conditions indicated in Proposition 4 are less
restrictive than those in Proposition 3, as can also be checked in Figure 4. In
fact, Proposition 4 contemplates the same condition present in Proposition
4 and, in addition, condition 2, i.e., k2 + kh < 1 and k2 ≥ 4
5 − 1
2kh.T h e
light grey area in Figure 4 represents the values of kh and k2 for which both
17Figure 4: Regions in the kh−k2 space in which ﬁrm 2 only ﬁnds the spillover
proﬁtable (dark grey region) or both ﬁrms ﬁnd the spillover optimal (ligh
grey region).
ﬁrms ﬁnd it proﬁtable to spill over knowledge in Area I. The dark grey area
represents the values for which the spillover is proﬁtable for ﬁrm 2 only. The
result is not surprising: ﬁrm 2 has high incentives to spill over knowledge in
order to poach the skilled worker, while ﬁrm 1, through the spillover, can
only lower the worker’s salary.To conclude the analysis of Area I,we need
to study the conditions under which either ﬁrm ﬁnds it proﬁtable to accept
knowledge from the rival. When the knowledge disclosure comes from ﬁrm
1, the spillover is, obviously, proﬁtable to ﬁrm 2. Since the latter would
not be able to hire the specialized worker without receiving knowledge, the
only eﬀect of the spillover is to increase its proﬁt. In contrast, the eﬀect of
ﬁrm 2’s spillover on ﬁrm 1’s net proﬁt is less obvious. On the one hand,
ﬁrm 1 is strengthened by more knowledge. On the other, by accepting more
knowledge, the ﬁrm loses the specialized worker. In the next Proposition we
18show that whenever it is proﬁtable for ﬁrm 2 to reveal knowledge, it is also
proﬁtable for ﬁrm 1 to accept it.






in Area I. For these levels, the net proﬁto fﬁrm 1,a f t e r
receiving the maximum spillover from ﬁrm 2, is higher than without spillover.
Proof. See Appendix
After the spillover, ﬁrm 2 reaches a level of knowledge K2 =1but has
to pay part of the gross proﬁts to the worker in terms of wage. Firm 1,
in contrast, keeps its original level of knowledge (K1 =1 ) (i.e., its level of
knowledge when employing the worker), but does not have to pay the worker
anymore. Clearly, it has to face a stronger rival, but this market externality
is low, as noted above. On the other hand, the wage that ﬁrm 2 has to pay is
even higher than what the worker received from ﬁrm 1,a si ti se a s yt oc h e c k .
Therefore, whenever ﬁrm 2 ﬁnds it proﬁtable to disclose knowledge, ﬁrm 1
ﬁnds it proﬁtable to accept it.
4.2 Technological Spillovers in Area II
In Section 3.2 we proved that ﬁrm 2 will hire the specialized worker if the
two entrepreneurs have levels of knowledge deﬁning Area II.I nA r e aII also
there is scope for knowledge spillovers. Entrepreneur 2 may be willing to
give knowledge to entrepreneur 1 in order to reduce the worker’s wage. And
entrepreneur 1 may be willing to give knowledge to entrepreneur 2 in order
to avoid losing the specialized worker.
We start our analysis by looking at the ﬁrst case. By revealing infor-
mation, ﬁrm 2 certainly reduces its gross proﬁt, as it strengthens the rival,
but it may be able to reduce the cost of human capital. We can show that,
indeed, the latter eﬀe c ti sa l w a y sd o m i n a n ti nt h i sa r e aa n d ,t h e r e f o r e ,t h e
spillover is always proﬁtable.
Proposition 6 In Area II,t h en e tp r o ﬁto fﬁrm 2 is increasing in the








The intuition for this result is similar to that for Proposition 1.W h e n
the two entrepreneurs have a similar level of knowledge, the worker is almost
19as useful to one ﬁrm as he is to the other. Therefore, he can appropriate
most of the surplus that he generates for either ﬁrm. Hence, in a situation
of almost symmetry, entrepreneur 2 has an incentive to reveal knowledge
to entrepreneur 1 in order to appropriate more of the surplus created by
the worker. With the spillover, the two entrepreneurs become indeed more
asymmetric in knowledge and this reduces the salary to be paid to the worker.
Despite the fact that the spillover increases the rival’s knowledge, the ﬁrm
ﬁnds it proﬁtable. In our model this is true for all the values of area II:f o r
all these values, the two entrepreneurs’s level of knowledge is so similar that
the spillover is always proﬁtable. Notice, in particular, that, after maximum
spillover, the worker’s knowledge is useless for ﬁrm 1’s production process.
Therefore, ﬁrm 2 just pays him the competitive wage, since his contribution
to the other ﬁrm’s knowledge is nought.
Let us analyze, now, the possibility that entrepreneur 1 reveals knowledge.
H em a yd os ot oa v o i dt h a tt h es k i l l e dw o r k e rl e a v e sf o rﬁrm 2. Indeed, after
the spillover, the worker may be less proﬁtable for ﬁrm 2 and, hence, ﬁrm 2
may have a lower incentive to poach him. In Figure 2 this is equivalent to
moving from a point in Area II t oap o i n ti nA r e aI0.
Proposition 7 Firm 1 ﬁnds it proﬁtable to spill over its knowledge to ﬁrm
2 in Area II if and only if k2 + kh ≥ 2k1 −
p
4k1 − 2 − k2
1. Moreover, the







If entrepreneur 1 reveals knowledge, he ﬁnds it proﬁtable to reveal all his
knowledge. Consider Figure 5 and take a point in Area II. The purpose of
ﬁrm 1’s knowledge revelation is to avoid the loss of the worker. Therefore,
after the spillover the levels of the entrepreneurs’ knowledge should belong to
Area I0. In this area, when the two entrepreneurs have a similar knowledge
level (i.e., for points close to the 45 degree line), the worker is able to appro-
priate most of the surplus that he creates. Therefore, entrepreneur 1 ﬁnds it
proﬁtable to reveal all his knowledge to create the maximal asymmetry with
the other entrepreneur and lower the worker’s wage. The optimal spillover is
again a corner solution.
For the spillover to be proﬁtable to ﬁrm 1, the knowledge level of ﬁrm
2 has to be higher than a critical threshold. This threshold is illustrated in
Figure 5 for diﬀerent values of kh. Note that — as the ﬁgure shows — the
threshold becomes irrelevant for kh > 2









Figure 5: Spillover from ﬁrm 1 to Firm 2 in area II.
21k2 +kh =2 k1 −
p
4k1 − 2 − k2
1 does not belong to Area II,a n dﬁrm 1 ﬁnds
the spillover proﬁtable for all values belonging to this area. While there is





,F i g u r e5s h o w st h a t
there is no lower bound, since for kh =0the threshold crosses area II in the
point k1 = k2 =1 .
When entrepreneur 2’s knowledge is below the threshold, ﬁrm 2’s total
knowledge is K2 = k2 +kh < 1 and ﬁrm 1’s proﬁt in the absence of spillover
is Π(k1,k 2 + kh). By revealing information, ﬁrm 1 would strengthen ﬁrm 2
(whose total knowledge would reach 1) and have a net proﬁto fΠ(1,1) −
(Π(1,k 1) − Π(1,1)). Avoiding labor poaching by ﬁrm 2 in such a case has a
lower beneﬁt than the cost of the information disclosure.
In other words, when the specialized worker has a level of knowledge
lower than 2
5,e n t r e p r e n e u r1 ﬁnds it proﬁtable to give knowledge to the rival
only if the rival is already strong enough. If, instead, the other entrepreneur
has a low level of knowledge, then the cost of strengthening him is higher
than the beneﬁt of keeping the worker. When the specialized worker has a
level of knowledge higher than 2
5,h ei ss ob e n e ﬁcial to the ﬁrm’s productivity
that entrepreneur 1 prefers to spill over knowledge to the rival for all values
belonging to Area II in order to avoid labor poaching.
To conclude the analysis of spillovers in area II we need to study the
conditions under which either ﬁrm ﬁnds it proﬁtable to accept knowledge
from the rival. The analysis is similar to that of Area I. When the knowledge
revelation comes from ﬁrm 2, the spillover is, obviously, always proﬁtable to
the other ﬁrm. Without receiving knowledge, this ﬁrm would not be able to
employ the specialized worker. Hence, the only eﬀect of the spillover is to
increase its proﬁt. The eﬀects of the spillover from ﬁrm 1 on ﬁrm 2’s net
proﬁt is not so obvious. This ﬁrm is strengthened by more knowledge. By
accepting more knowledge, however, the ﬁrm loses the opportunity to poach
the specialized worker. Now we show that whenever revealing knowledge is
proﬁtable for entrepreneur 1, accepting it is proﬁtable for ﬁrm 2.
Proposition 8 The net proﬁto fﬁrm 2 after maximal spillover from ﬁrm 1
in Area II is always higher than the net proﬁt in the absence of spillover.
Proof. See Appendix.
After maximal spillover, ﬁrm 2 has proﬁt Π(1,1). In the absence of
spillovers, its proﬁtw o u l db e
Π(min(k2 + kh,1),k 1) − [Π(1,k 2) − Π(k1,min(k2 + kh,1))].
22Intuitively, in Area II this second expression is always lower than the ﬁrst,
since the salary to pay to the worker is high, relative to the surplus that he
produces. In Area II the two entrepreneurs have similar levels of knowledge.
Therefore, even if ﬁrm 2 hires the worker, it cannot completely exploit the
quasi-rent that he generates. For this reason, ﬁrm 2 ﬁnds it proﬁtable to
accept the spillover and not to poach the worker.
5 Knowledge Spillovers and Labor Mobility
in Equilibrium
We are now ready to discuss the equilibrium outcomes in terms of knowledge
spillovers and labor mobility. To start our analysis we prove a simple but
useful result. In equilibrium, it is impossible to have bilateral spillovers:
the proﬁto ft h eﬁrm who does not employ the worker is decreasing in the
other ﬁrm’s level of knowledge, therefore the former has no incentive to give
knowledge to the latter.
Lemma 9 If, in equilibrium, ﬁrm j employs the workers, then ﬁrm i (i 6= j)
has no incentive to spill over knowledge to ﬁrm j.
Proof. See Appendix.
Given this result, we have only to study the cases in which there is
spillover from ﬁrm 1 to ﬁrm 2 or vice versa. The analysis of the previ-
ous Section delivers the equilibrium outcomes as immediate corollaries. We
summarize the outcomes in the two areas identiﬁed above in the following
propositions. The ﬁrst refers to Area I.
Proposition 10 If there is a duopoly (i.e., k1 + kh ≤ 2k2), Area I can be
divided into three regions.
Region Ia, characterized by the following conditions:
1) k1 + k2 ≤ 1,o r
2) k1 + kh < 1,o r
3) k1 + k2 ≥ 1, k2 + kh ≥ 1 and k2 < 3
5,o r
4) k1 + k2 ≥ 1, k1 + kh ≥ 1, k2 + kh < 1 and k2 < 4
5 − 1
2kh.
In this region, there exists a unique equilibrium: no spillover occurs, and ﬁrm
1 keeps the worker.
Region Ib, characterized by the following conditions:
23k1 + kh ≥ 1,a n d4
5 − 1
2kh ≤ k2 < 1 − kh.
In this region, there exists a unique equilibrium: there is spillover from ﬁrm
2t oﬁrm 1, ρ2 ≥ 1−k1
k2 , and the worker moves to ﬁrm 2.
Region Ic, characterized by the following condition:
k2 ≥ max
©




In this region there exist two equilibria: the ﬁrst one is identical to that of
Region Ib; in the second, there is spillover from ﬁrm 1 to ﬁrm 2, ρ1 ≥ 1−k2
k1 ,
and the worker remains at ﬁrm 1. Firms are indiﬀerent between the two
equilibria, since K1 = K2 =1in both of them.
In the next proposition we illustrate the equilibrium outcomes in Area
II.
Proposition 11 If there is duopoly (i.e., k1 + kh ≤ 2k2), Area II can be
divided into two regions.
Region IIa, characterized by the following condition:
k2 + kh < 2k1 −
p
4k1 − 2 − k2
1.
In this region there exists only one equilibrium: there is spillover from ﬁrm 2





,a n dt h ef o r m e rﬁrm hires the worker.
Region IIb, characterized by the following condition:
k2 + kh ≥ 2k1 −
p
4k1 − 2 − k2
1.
In this region there exist two equilibria: the ﬁrst is identical to that of region






and no labor mobility. Firms obtain the same proﬁt in the two equilibria since
K1 = K2 =1in both of them.
Given that both propositions are an immediate corollary of the previous
ones, we do not provide a proof. We illustrate the propositions in Figure 6.
The ﬁgure is drawn for a level of kh =0 .3.
For low levels of k2, (i.e., k1+kh > 2k2) the industry is a monopoly (area
M). In this case there is no spillover and no labor mobility.
F o rh i g h e rl e v e l so fk2 (ﬁrm 2 is more eﬃcient), the industry is a duopoly.
Nevertheless, for k2 belonging to area Ia, there is no spillover and no labor
mobility. In fact, for k2 just suﬃcient to have a duopoly, ﬁrm 2 is unable to
poach the worker from ﬁrm 1.A tt h es a m et i m e ,ﬁrm 1 has no incentive to
share knowledge with ﬁrm 2, since the worker’s salary decreases signiﬁcantly
only if the two ﬁrms have a similar level of knowledge.
24When k2 is even higher (areas Ib and IIa), we have spillover from ﬁrm
2 to ﬁrm 1 and labor poaching. Hence, in equilibrium the worker will be
hired by ﬁrm 2. Finally, for a large k2 (areas Ic and IIb), also ﬁrm 1 has an
incentive to spill over knowledge to ﬁrm 2, in order to reduce the wage (area
Ia) or to avoid labor poaching and lowering the wage (in area IIb). Hence, in
these areas there are multiple equilibria: one equilibrium with spillover from
ﬁrm 1 to ﬁrm 2 and no labor mobility and one with spillover form ﬁrm 2 to
ﬁrm 1 and labor poaching. In both equilibria the ﬁrms obtain the highest
level of eﬃciency, i.e., K1 = K2 =1 .
For diﬀerent levels of kh the ﬁgure is only slightly diﬀerent. For kh ≤ 1
5,
region Icdisappears, i.e., in Area I there are only equilibria with no spillover
or with spillovers from ﬁrm 2 to ﬁrm 1. In fact, when the worker has a low
level of knowledge, the beneﬁtf o rﬁrm 1 of lowering his salary through the
spillover is always lower than the cost of strengthening the other ﬁrm.
Finally, for kh ≥ 2
5,r e g i o n sIb and IIa disappear and only three possi-
bilities survive: monopoly, no spillover and multiple equilibria. Indeed, in
this case, the worker is so important that, unless there is no possibility for
labor poaching (in areas M and Ia), both ﬁrms have an incentive to spill
over knowledge to the rival in order to employ him and lower his salary.
6 Discussion
We have studied how technological knowledge can spill over from one ﬁrm
to another through two channels: entrepreneurs can decide to reveal knowl-
edge to their competitors; and specialized workers can transfer information
by moving from one employer to another. Knowledge revelation is a way
through which ﬁrms can lower labor cost. It is also an instrument to compete
on the skilled labor market. In the absence of direct knowledge revelation,
still spillovers can occur, since specialized workers trained at one ﬁrm can
be hired by another. Labor mobility and knowledge revelation are not mu-
tually exclusive. There are indeed cases in which both phenomena occur in
equilibrium.
Direct knowledge revelation occurs in equilibrium only when both en-
trepreneurs have a relatively high level of knowledge. Spillovers and labor
mobility are more likely when entrepreneurs have similar levels of knowl-
edge and, therefore, a similar market share. Under these circumstances, the
ﬁrms are more willing to reveal information in order to reduce the labor cost.
25Figure 6: Characterization of the equilibria.
M: Monopoly
Ia: No spillover. Firm 1 hires the worker
Ib and IIa: Spillover from 2 to 1 and 2 hires the worker
Ic and IIb: Multiple equilibria
26Not surprisingly, knowledge spillovers and labor mobility are also more likely
when the specialized worker has a higher level of knowledge and, therefore,
a higher impact on productivity.
Almost all the studies in the literature on technological innovation con-
sider spillovers as an involuntary leakage of information (due to reverse en-
gineering, industrial espionage, ineﬀectiveness of the patent law). Our work,
in contrast, shows that entrepreneurs have incentives to disseminate infor-
mation voluntarily. This is a particularly novel contribution of our paper.
Furthermore, the few theoretical papers that admit endogenous spillovers
(see, e.g., Combes and Duranton, 2001, Gersbach, and Schmutzler, 2003,
and Fosfuri and Ronde, 2004) show that spillovers occur through workers
turnover. We have shown that knowledge can (voluntarily) ﬂow from one
ﬁrm to another even in the absence of labor mobility. Our analysis can ac-
count for knowledge spillovers even in industrial clusters where there is no
evidence of a high rate of turnover.15
There is anecdotal evidence of voluntary information sharing in industrial
clusters. The literature on industrial clusters, however, typically explains it
by invoking reciprocity or the cooperative environment that can be sustained
when the same ﬁrms operate for years in the same area. While we do not deny
the importance of such factors in explaining localized technological spillovers,
we suggest that voluntary dissemination of information could simply stem out
of ﬁrms’ competition in the labor and in the good markets.
In our analysis we have assumed, for simplicity, that workers can move
from one ﬁrm to another at no cost. If, in contrast, moving is costly, the
analysis would change in a straightforward way. Clearly, the higher this cost,
the lower the outside option for the worker and the lower the incentive of
the entrepreneurs to share knowledge with the rivals. Indeed, if this cost
were high enough, no spillover and no labor mobility should be expected.
This consideration leads to an immediate explanation of the dimension of
industrial districts. Industrial districts typically do not expand beyond a
particular geographical area. It is also well known that the labor market
for skilled workers is itself localized in that area. Our model indicates that,
indeed, the dimension of the labor market determines the dimension of the
district. Firms belonging to the district do not have any incentive to spill
over knowledge to ﬁrms far away, as these are not competitors on the labor
15A low rate of turnover is, for instance, documented for the Italian districts by De
Blasio and Di Addario (2002).
27market, provided that the moving cost for the workers is suﬃciently high.
At the same time, the transportation costs impede the transfer of knowledge
through labor mobility. Therefore, the technological externalities that fuel
industrial districts do not exceed some geographical borders.
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307 Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. We must consider three cases:
Case 1: k2 + kh ≤ 1
2k1. T h i sc a s ei st r i v i a l ,a st h ep o t e n t i a le n t r a n tw o u l d
not be able to enter the market even by hiring the worker. Therefore, there
is no scope for worker mobility.
Case 2: 1
2k1 <k 2 + kh ≤ 2k1. In this case if the worker moves to ﬁrm 2,
in equilibrium there will be a duopoly. By avoiding that the worker leaves
for the entrant ﬁrm, ﬁrm 1 avoids the following loss: ΠM(min(k1 + kh,1))−
Π(k1,min(k2 + kh,1)). On the other hand, by hiring the worker, the po-
tential entrant would earn Π(min(k2 + kh,1),k 1). Hence, we have to prove
that
Π
M(min(k1 + kh,1)) − Π(k1,min(k2 + kh,1)) ≥
Π(min(k2 + kh,1),k 1).
This follows immediately from the following inequalities:
Π
M(min(k1 + kh,1)) ≥ Π
M(min(k2 + kh,1)) >
Π(k1,min(k2 + kh,1)) + Π(min(k2 + kh,1),k 1),
where the second inequality is easily veriﬁed, as the proﬁto fam o n o p o l i s ti s
higher than the sum of the proﬁts of two duopolists.
Case 3: k2 + kh > 2k1. For these parameter values, if the worker moves to
ﬁrm 2, ﬁrm 2 will become monopolist. Therefore we have
Π
M(min(k1 + kh,1)) ≥ Π
M(min(k2 + kh,1)).
Given that we have assumed that the worker prefers to stay at ﬁrm 1 even
i nt h ec a s eh ei so ﬀe r e dt h es a m ew a g ef r o mt h et w oﬁrms, the proposition
follows immediately.¥
Proof of Lemma 2. By hiring the worker, each ﬁrm obtains the following
increase of gross proﬁts:
Π(min(ki + kh,1),k j) − Π(ki,min(kj + kh,1)).
Therefore, ﬁrm 1 has a higher (not smaller) incentive to hire the worker if
and only if
Π(min(k1 + kh,1),k 2) − Π(k1,min(k2 + kh,1)) ≥
Π(min(k2 + kh,1),k 1)+Π(k2,min(k1 + kh,1))
31We have to distinguish three cases.
Case 1: k1 + kh < 1. The above inequality is equivalent to
Π(k1 + kh,k 2) − Π(k1,k 2 + kh)−
Π(k2 + kh,k 1)+Π(k2,k 1 + kh)=2( k1 − k2)kh ≥ 0,
which is always satisﬁed.
Case 2: k1 + kh ≥ 1 and k2 + kh < 1. The inequality is equivalent to


























Case 3: k2 + kh ≥ 1. The inequality is equivalent to
Π(1,k 2) − Π(k1,1) − Π(1,k 1)+Π(k2,1) =
1
9
(5k2 − 8+5 k1)(k2 − k1) ≥ 0






Finally, notice the following two observations.
First, for kh < 1
5 Case 3 is irrelevant. Indeed, if kh < 1
5, the inequality
k2 + kh ≥ 1 implies that k2 > 4
5. However, given that k1 >k 2, it is never
possible that the constraint k2 ≤ 8
5 − k1 be satisﬁed.







left in the point where k1 = kh+ 3
5, which implies k2 =1−kh.F o rkh = 1
5 the
two curves cross at k1 = k2 = 4
5,a n df o rkh = 2
5 they cross at k1 =1 .H e n c e ,
for 1
5 ≤ kh ≤ 2
5, we are in Case 2 to the right of the intersection and in Case
3 to the left of it. For kh > 2
5 we are always in Case 3. For an illustration,
see Figure 1 in the text.¥
32P r o o fo fL e m m a9 . The spillover from ﬁrm i to ﬁrm j can be represented
by an increase in Kj, provided that Kj < 1. The proﬁto ft h eﬁrm that does




(2min(1,K i) − min(1,K j))
2






9 (2min(1,K i) − min(1,K j)) < 0 if Kj < 1
0 if Kj ≥ 1.
¥
Proof of Proposition 3.W e ,ﬁrst, prove that the optimal spillover must
be a corner solution. We have to distinguish three cases:
Case 1: k1 + kh < 1.
Firm 1’s proﬁti s














This derivative is non negative if and only if
k2 ≥ 2k1 +8 kh.
Even if ﬁrm 1 transfer all of its knowledge to ﬁrm 2,t h eﬁnal level of knowl-
edge for ﬁrm 2 is k2 + k1 and it is not possible that
K2 = k2 + k1 ≥ 2k1 +8 kh.
Therefore, the derivative with respect to k2 is always negative and the optimal
level of spillover is ρ1 =0 .
Case 2: k1 + kh ≥ 1, k2 + kh < 1.
Firm 1’s proﬁti s

















which is positive if and only if
2k1 + k2 − 4kh − 4 ≥ 0,
which is clearly impossible. Hence ρ1 =0 .
Case 3: k2 + kh ≥ 1.
Firm 1’s proﬁti s











which is either always positive or ﬁrst negative and then positive. Hence, the
optimal spillover is a corner solution. To ﬁnd the conditions under which the
optimal solution is ρ1 =1we compare the net proﬁto fﬁrm 1 for ρ1 =0and
ρ1 =1 , i.e., we check when the following inequality is satisﬁed:
Π(1,k 2) − (Π(1,k 1) − Π(k2,1)) ≤ Π(1,1) − (Π(1,k 1) − Π(1,1)).
This is equivalent to
Π(1,k 2)+Π(k2,1) − 2Π(1,1) ≤ 0,
which is true for k2 ≥ 3
5.
Finally, we have to check that, after the spillover, ﬁrm 1 will indeed be able
to keep the worker. After the spillover, K2 =1 .M o r e o v e r ,b yL e m m a2 ,ﬁrm
1 will be able to keep the worker after the spillover if K2 ≥ 8
5 − k1 (notice
that for K2 >K 1 the signs of the inequalities in the Lemma are reversed),
which means 1 ≥ 8
5 − k1.T h i si sc l e a r l ys a t i s ﬁed, given that k1 >k 2 ≥ 3
5.¥
Proof of Proposition 4. In the absence of spillovers, ﬁrm 2’s proﬁti s
Π(k2,min(k1 + kh,1)).
If it spills knowledge over to ﬁrm 1 and hires the worker, its proﬁt will be
Π(min(k2 + kh,1),min(k1 + ρ2k2,1))−
(Π(min(k1 + ρ2k2 + kh,1),k 2) − Π(min(k1 + ρ2k2,1),min(k2 + kh,1))).
34We ﬁrst prove that the solution for the optimal spillover must be a corner
one. We have to distinguish three cases.
Case 1: k2 + kh > 1.
In this case ﬁrm 2’s proﬁti s








Therefore, the proﬁt has a minimum for k1 = 4
5 and the optimal spillover is
a corner solution.
Case 2: k1 + kh > 1,k 2 + kh ≤ 1.
In this case, ﬁrm 2’s proﬁti s
Π(k2 + kh,k 1) − Π(1,k 2)+Π(k1,k 2 + kh),
whose derivative with respect to k1 is
∂
∂k1
(Π(k2 + kh,k 1) − Π(1,k 2)+Π(k1,k 2 + kh)) =
2
9
(5k1 − 4k2 − 4kh).
Therefore, the proﬁt has a minimum in k1 = 4
5 (k2 + kh) and the optimal
spillover is a corner solution.
Case 3: k1 + kh ≤ 1.
In this region the proﬁtf o rﬁrm 2 is




(Π(k2 + kh,k 1) − Π(k1 + kh,k 2)+Π(k1,k 2 + kh)) =
2
9
(k1 − 2k2 − 8kh),
which is positive if
k1 ≥ 2k2 +8 kh.
35Hence the solution is a corner one.
Therefore, in all three cases, the optimal spillover must be ρ2 ∈ {0,1}.L e t
us ﬁnd the solution in the various cases.
Case 1a: k2 + kh > 1 and k1 + k2 > 1.
In this case the spillover is proﬁtable if













which is satisﬁed for k2 > 3
5. After (maximal) spillover, ﬁrm 1 will have a
level of knowledge K1 =1 . Notice that the levels of knowledge K1 =1and
k2 > 3
5 belong to area II (i.e., respect the conditions of Lemma 2 for ﬁrm 2
to hire the worker) and, hence, ﬁrm 2 will, indeed, be able to hire the worker.
Case 1b: k2 + kh > 1 and k1 + k2 ≤ 1.
In this case, the spillover is proﬁtable if






1 +1 0 k1k2 − 8k1
¢
≥ 0,
which is satisﬁed for k2 ≥ 4
5 − 1
2k1. Notice, however, that this inequality,
along with k1 + k2 ≤ 1, implies k1 ≤ 2
5 and k2 ≥ 3
5, which is, clearly a
contradiction. Thus there cannot be spillover.
Case 2a: k1 + kh > 1,k 2 + kh ≤ 1 and k1 + k2 > 1.
In this case the spillover is proﬁtable if
Π(k2 + kh,1) − Π(1,k 2)+Π(1,k 2 + kh) − Π(k2,1) =
1
9
kh (−8+1 0 k2 +5 kh) ≥ 0
which is satisﬁed for k2 > 4
5 − 1
2kh.N o t i c et h a tk2+kh ≤ 1 and k2 > 4
5 − 1
2kh
imply k2 > 3
5 and kh < 2
5. Therefore, after the spillover, ﬁrm 1 will have a
level of knowledge K1 =1 . By Lemma 2, the level of k2 compatible with
























36Hence, after the spillover, ﬁrm 2 will indeed be able to hire the worker.
Case 2b k1 + kh > 1,k 2 + kh ≤ 1, k1 + k2 ≤ 1.
In this case the spillover is proﬁtable if




































kh + k1 +4−
q
(16k2
h − 22k1kh +8 kh +1 6 k2
1 +8 k1 +1 )
¶
.
This inequality, along with k1 + k2 ≤ 1, implies (after some manipulation)
15kh − 30k1kh +6 kh > 0, whose solution is kh > 2k1 − 2
5.R e m e m b e r ,
however, that in this case kh < 2
5. These two last equalities imply that
k1 < 2
5. Therefore, k1 +kh < 1, which is a contradiction. Hence, in this case
there is no spillover.
Case 3a: k1 + kh ≤ 1, k1 + k2 > 1.
In this case the spillover is proﬁtable if and only if











This inequality can never be satisﬁed. In fact a necessary condition for ρ2 =1
is that, starting from a certain level, the proﬁt increases in the knowledge of
ﬁrm 1.B u t ,a sp r o v e na b o v e ,t h i si st r u eo n l yf o rk1 ≥ 2k2 +8 kh.T h i sl a s t
condition implies that k2 ≤ 1
2 and kh ≤ 1
8. Using these conditions into the
previous inequality, we have




1 − 2k1kh ≤





























where the last inequality comes from the fact that the last polynomial does
not have real roots.
37Case 3b: k1 + kh ≤ 1, k1 + k2 ≤ 1.
The proof for this case uses an argument similar to that of case 2b.¥
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n5 .F i r m2 ﬁnds it proﬁtable to spill over knowledge
when
Π(min(k2 + kh,1),min(k1 + ρ2k2,1))−
(Π(min(k1 + ρ2k2 + kh,1),k 2) − Π(min(k1 + ρ2k2,1),min(k2 + kh,1))) ≥
Π(k2,min(k1 + kh,1)).
Firm 1 ﬁnds it proﬁtable to accept the spillover if and only if
Π(min(k1 + kh,1),k 2) − (Π(min(k2 + kh,1),k 1)−
+Π(min(k1 + k2,1),min(k2 + kh,1))) ≥ Π(k2,min(k1 + kh,1)).
Remember that ﬁrm 2 spills over knowledge to ﬁrm 1 in two cases
1) k2 + kh > 1, k1 + k2 > 1,a n dk2 ≥ 3
5,
2) k1 + kh > 1,k 1 + k2 > 1, k2 + kh < 1,a n dk2 ≥ 4
5 − 1
2kh.
In case 1) the ﬁrst inequality becomes
Π(1,1) − Π(1,k 2)+Π(1,1) ≥ Π(k2,1),
while the second becomes
Π(1,1) − Π(1,k 2)+Π(1,k 1) ≥ Π(k2,1).
Clearly the ﬁrst implies the second. Similarly, in case 2) the ﬁrst inequality
is
Π(k2 + kh,1) − Π(1,k 2)+Π(1,k 2 + kh) ≥ Π(k2,1),
and the second is
Π(1,k 2) − (Π(k2 + kh,k 1) − Π(1,k 2 + kh)) ≥ Π(k2,1).
Again, the ﬁrst implies the second.¥
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n6 .W eﬁrst prove that ﬁrm 2’s proﬁti si n c r e a s i n gi n
t h es p i l l o v e r .W eh a v et oc o n s i d e rt w oc a s e s :
Case 1: k2 + kh ≥ 1.
In this case, ﬁrm 2’s net proﬁti s
Π(1,k 1 + ρ2k2) − (Π(1,k 2) − Π(k1 + ρ2k2,1)),
38whose derivative w.r.t. ρ2 is
∂
∂ρ2












This derivative is always positive, as k1 > 4
5 in area II (since 4
5 is the solution
of k1 = 8
5 − k1).
Case 2: k2 + kh < 1.
In this case, ﬁrm 2’s net proﬁti s
Π(k2 + kh,k 1 + ρ2k2) − (Π(1,k 2) − Π(k1 + ρ2k2,k 2 + kh)),
whose derivative w.r.t. ρ2 is
∂
∂ρ2
(Π(k2 + kh,k 1 + ρ2k2)+Π(k1 + ρ2k2,k 2 + kh)) =
2
9
k2 (5ρ2k2 +5 k1 − 4(k2 + kh)),
which is always positive, as k1 > 4
5 in area II.
Now we show that, after maximal spillover, ﬁrm 2 is still able to hire the
worker, i.e., we are still in Area II. Given that the spillover is equivalent







5 − k1 are decreasing in k1 in the Area under analy-
sis. The latter expression is, indeed, decreasing for any value of k1,a si ti s
immediate to check. Let us consider the former. Its derivative w.r.t. k1 is
16kh − 25k1kh +1 0 k2
h − 20k1 +1 0 k2
1 +1 0
(4(1 − k1)+5 kh)
2 ,




(40kh +2 5 k2
h).T h e r e -
fore the expression represents a maximum. Consider, ﬁrst, the case kh > 1
5.






5 − k1 at k1 = kh + 3
5.
Therefore, if we prove that in the maximum k1 is lower than kh + 3
5,w ea r e
sure that in our area the function is always decreasing. This is indeed the








(40kh +2 5 k2
h) ≤ kh +
3
5
39is equivalent to 280kh+200k2
h−64 = 8(5kh +8 )( 5 kh − 1) ≥ 0,w h o s es o l u t i o n
is kh > 1
5.
C o n s i d e r ,n o w ,t h ec a s ekh < 1






crosses the 45 degree line for k1 =1− kh. Hence, we must prove that in the








(40kh +2 5 k2
h) < 1 − kh
is equivalent to 360kh − 1800k2
h = −360kh (5kh − 1) < 0, whose solution is
kh < 1
5.¥
Proof of Proposition 7. We know from Lemma 2 that in this Area k1 +
kh > 1. Moreover, from the same Lemma, it is straightforward to check that
k1 + k2 > 1.W e ﬁrst prove that the solution for the optimal spillover is a
corner one. Firm 1’s proﬁt after the spillover is
Π(1,k 2) − (Π(1,k 1) − Π(k2,1)).
Its derivative w.r.t. the knowledge of ﬁrm 2 is
∂
∂k2







Given that this derivative is positive for k2 > 4
5, the spillover must be a
corner solution.
Given this result, we must compare ﬁrm 1’s proﬁtf o rρ1 =0and ρ1 =1 .
For ρ1 =0 , ﬁrm 1 earns
Π(k1,min(k2 + kh,1)),
while for ρ1 =1it earns
Π(1,1) − (Π(1,k 1) − Π(1,1)) =
2Π(1,1) − Π(1,k 1).
There are two cases:
Case 1: k2 + kh ≥ 1.
Firm 1 chooses to give spillover iﬀ
Π(k1,1) − 2Π(1,1) + Π(1,k 1) ≤ 0,
40true for k1 ≥ 3
5,w h i c hi nA r e aII is certainly satisﬁed for Lemma 2. More-
over, after the spillover the level of knowledge of ﬁrm 2 is K2 =m i n( k1 + k2,1)
=1 ,s i n c ek1 +k2 ≥ 7
5. Therefore, the levels of knowledge after the spillover
belong to Area I0 and ﬁrm 1 will hire the worker.
Case 2: k2 + kh < 1.
Firm 1 chooses to give spillover iﬀ
Π(k1,k 2 + kh) − Π(1,1) + (Π(1,k 1) − Π(1,1)) ≤ 0,
true for k2 ≥ 2k1 − kh −
p
4k1 − 2 − k2
1 (notice that 4k1 − 2 − k2
1 is positive
as k1 > 2 −
√
2 is always satisﬁed in Area II,s i n c e4
5 > 2 −
√
2).
Note that we can rewrite the inequality k2 ≥ 2k1 − kh −
p
4k1 − 2 − k2
1 as
k2 + kh ≥ 2k1 −
p
4k1 − 2 − k2
1.F u r t h e r m o r e ,2k1 −
p
4k1 − 2 − k2
1 < 1 for
k1 ≥ 3
5, because we are always in Area II.
By combining Case 1 and Case 2 we ﬁnd the condition expressed in the
Proposition.
To conclude the proof, we have to show that, after the spillover, ﬁrm 1 will
be able to keep the worker. Since after the spillover k1 + k2 ≥ 7
5,a si nt h e
previous point, after the spillover the levels of knowledge are in region I0.¥
Proof of Proposition 8. In Area II, without spillovers ﬁrm 2 earns
Π(min(k2 + kh,1),k 1) − (Π(1,k 2) − Π(k1,min(k2 + kh,1))),
while with spillover from ﬁrm 1 it obtains
Π(1,1).
Hence it will accept the spillover iﬀ:
Π(min(k2 + kh,1),k 1)−Π(1,k 2)+Π(k1,min(k2 + kh,1))−Π(1,1) ≤ 0 (2)
There are two cases:
1) k2 + kh ≥ 1 and
2) k2 + kh < 1.





41which implies that k1 ≥ 4
5. Therefore, condition (2) becomes:











which is satisﬁed for




Indeed, this inequality is satisﬁed since the right hand side is no smaller than
k1.I nf a c t ,
2 −
q










=4 k1 (1 − k1) ≥ 0,
which is always satisﬁed.









Moreover, in this Area the acceptance rule is







1 − 8k1k2 − 8k1kh +4 k
2
2 +1 0 k2kh +5 k
2
h +4 k2 − 5
¢
≤ 0.
The condition (2) is satisﬁed for what previously proved. If we compare (4)




1 − 8k1k2 − 8k1kh +4 k
2
2 +1 0 k2kh +5 k
2











then we have proved the Proposition. The above expression is equivalent to
−8k1 − 5k
2
2 +8 k1k2 +8 k1kh − 10k2kh − 5k
2
h +5≥ 0
which is satisﬁed for
8
5
k1 − 1 − kh ≤ k2 ≤ 1 − kh











k1 − 1 − kh.
In fact this expression is equivalent to
1
10
−80khk1 +6 5+3 9 k2
1 +2 5 k2
h − 104k1 +9 0 kh
4(1− k1)+5 kh
≥ 0.





which is clearly satisﬁed.¥
43